Viewers of the movie Swordfish may remember that despite its somewhat unrealistic portrayal of hacking (as a computer science major, I must admit that while we never watch polyhedrons fit together as our programs compile, it is true that we often do our best coding under the influence of alcohol and in the company of scantily-clad women), it had some rather brilliant ideas. One, of course, was casting Halle Berry. More relevant to this article, however, was the political premise of the movie – or at least that of Gabriel Shear (played by John Travolta), the movie's morally ambiguous antagonist.

Shear leads an extralegal (or criminal, if you prefer) organization whose goal is to protect America by terrorizing terrorists and their supporters. (Terrorize the terrorists? Brilliant!) A worthy goal, to be sure. The trouble is that in order to fund his operation, he conducts a high-tech, hostage-taking heist inside the United States and proceeds to do a whole bunch of other not-so-good things.

Secret, extralegal, minimally monitored organizations aren't mere Hollywood fantasy, nor are they new. Such a unit, for example, was involved in U.S. support of the Contras – and quite a few scandals – in the 1980's. As the United States conducts the War on Terrorism, the use of covert organizations is once again a potentially boiling issue. If government officials are in fact seriously considering whether the U.S. could effectively expand the use of small, secret organizations in order to "terrorize the terrorists," they are also certainly aware that any such expansion could potentially invite a host of oversight issues.

Seymour Hersh recently reported in the New Yorker that the U.S. has sent secret reconnaissance teams into Iran to pinpoint nuclear weapons facilities and other targets in preparation for a possible strike. Furthermore, Hersh argues that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is trying to concentrate control over special operations in the hands of the Pentagon, going over the heads of regional commanders, and – in particular – cutting the CIA out of the special-ops picture. Within the Administration, the Pentagon enjoys a strong political advantage over the CIA. Legally, too, the Pentagon has an apparent advantage: the rules on Congressional oversight are not as clear for military special-ops as for the CIA's operations. This is where the "terrorize the terrorists" idea comes into play.

Hersh points to two areas of expansion for the War on Terrorism. First, he suggests that with the Pentagon's broad control over special operations, Special Forces teams could go on the offensive and start hunting terrorists in a wide swath of countries, including ones that have been relatively cooperative. Special Forces could, for instance, emulate Britain's 1950's success against the insurgency in Kenya, where British officials recruited locals to join the insurgency, then either ambushed the real insurgents or called in the Royal Air Force. Besides wiping out terrorists, this strategy has the added benefit of making terrorist groups paranoid about recruiting new members.

But that’s not to say these special-ops missions don’t have their problems. If the U.S. chooses to puruse such a strategy, the government must determine the appropriate monitoring channels and the extent of oversight. The Pentagon sees its less stringent oversight requirements as an advantage, allowing it to act more quickly and to keep its actions within a small "need to know" circle. The CIA, on the other hand, believes the Pentagon is more adept at "shock and awe" than stealth and artifice that covert ops demand.

On the other hand, it's no secret that Iran has been a splinter of evil lodged between two recently liberated countries – Afghanistan and Iraq. Hersh reports that the Pentagon is drafting new contingency plans for an invasion of Iran, given that U.S. forces could now attack from the east or the west. It's only a contingency, but future events – particularly, Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons – could make it the next front in the War on Terrorism. If diplomacy fails to dissuade Iran from its nuclear ambitions, Hersh argues, the U.S. might use a military solution of some kind – either a limited series of air strikes and incursions to take out Iran's military facilities or a full-scale invasion to take out its regime. In fact, he reports, some in the Pentagon hope that a limited strike would incite a popular uprising against the hated Iranian regime.

It is this idea of regime change and the expansion of democracy that is central to the neoconservative philosophy of the Bush administration. With Iran, as with Iraq, weapons of mass destruction are an important concern, but the overarching foreign policy of this administration is not only to hunt down terrorists and WMDs, but also to actively encourage democracy. In his second inaugural address, President Bush made it perfectly clear that U.S. efforts so far – bringing democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq – were only the kindling of a much greater goal:

"[B]ecause we have acted in the great liberating tradition of this nation, tens of millions have achieved their freedom. And as hope kindles hope, millions more will find it. By our efforts, we have lit a fire as well - a fire in the minds of men. It warms those who feel its power, it burns those who fight its progress, and one day this untamed fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world."

Is Iran next to receive this gift of fire? It might well be. But perhaps the United States will not need missiles to deliver it. The Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran (SMCCDI) reports that Bush's speech was well received by "millions of Iranians" hoping to rid themselves of Iran's theocracy. The SMCCDI writes that Iranians, looking for support from "the World's super power, [...] are now becoming sure that Mr. Bush's agenda is indeed to help them to gain Freedom, Secularity and Democracy." Even so, the article goes on to say that any military strike would "help the Mullahcracy to consolidate its illegitimate and unpopular power, while causing heavy financial damages and human causalities." Instead, the SMCCDI hopes that U.S. moral and financial support lead to a regime change without military intervention.

President Bush's second Inaugural Address seems to clarify some points of his neoconservative philosophy. The expansion of democracy, he said, "is not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend ourselves and our friends by force of arms when necessary. Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities." While some have speculated that the neoconservative impulse is to use Iraq and Afghanistan as a staging ground for further invasions (namely, of Iran), they mistake for militarism what really is idealism.

President Bush understands that while "shock and awe" was effective at taking down Saddam's totalitarian regime, what will really "terrorize the terrorists" in the long run is building up democratic institutions. Any terrorist who doesn't soil himself when a daisy-cutter (a.k.a. Mother Of All Bombs) falls next to him is probably already dead. But if Bush wants to terrify the terrorists out of an entire country, he must help the country become democratic, and let the "untamed fire of freedom" smoke them out.